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SEXUAL ORIENTATION DISCRIMINATION
UNDER TITLE VII: THE PROMISING ROAD
AHEAD
Sydney Wright*
I. INTRODUCTION
What does it mean to discriminate against an individual on the
basis of that individual’s sex? Title VII prohibits an employer from
“discriminat[ing] against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”1 And since
its adoption in 1964, litigants have, in one way or another, repeatedly
posed this question for courts to determine.
While most courts historically have held that “sex” does not include sexual orientation2—meaning an action against an employer for
discriminating against a homosexual employee is not legally cognizable under Title VII—in recent years following the Supreme Court’s
decision in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,3 courts have reconsidered
the logic behind such a determination.
Perhaps, sexual orientation discrimination is in fact discrimination on the basis of sex insofar as the crux of homosexuality is a sexual
relationship between two people of the same gender. In other words,

* J.D. Candidate, May 2019, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles; B.A., Anthropology and
Political Science, University of California, Irvine, 2016. Thanks to Professor Robert Brain for his
feedback and guidance throughout the writing process, to the members of Loyola of Los Angeles
Law Review for their hard work, and to my family and friends for their unrelenting support.
1. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2012) (emphasis added).
2. See, e.g., Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757 (6th Cir. 2006); Medina v. Income
Support Div., 413 F.3d 1131 (10th Cir. 2005); Rene v. MGM Grand Hotel, Inc., 305 F.3d 1061
(9th Cir. 2002); Bibby v. Phila. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 260 F.3d 257 (3d Cir. 2001); Hamner v.
St. Vincent Hosp. & Health Care Ctr., Inc., 224 F.3d 701 (7th Cir. 2000); Simonton v. Runyon, 232
F.3d 33 (2d Cir. 2000); Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., 194 F.3d 252 (1st Cir. 1999);
Wrightson v. Pizza Hut of Am., Inc., 99 F.3d 138 (4th Cir. 1996) (abrogated on other grounds);
Williamson v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 876 F.2d 69 (8th Cir. 1989).
3. 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (recognizing discrimination based on gender stereotyping or gender
non-conformity as legally cognizable sex-based discrimination).
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as one scholar frames the argument, “[t]he discharge of a male employee because he has a male lover is an action that would not be taken
against a similarly situated female employee.”4
Nonetheless, the Eleventh Circuit recently held in Evans v. Georgia Regional Hospital5 that discrimination based on sexual orientation
is not actionable under Title VII.6 In a strongly worded dissent, Circuit
Judge Rosenbaum explained why the majority’s and concurrence’s decision rests on unsettled ground at best.7 This Comment will explore
the majority, concurring, and dissenting opinions in Evans and discuss
why the dissent’s view is more consistent with the evolution of the law
and is likewise gaining momentum in other circuits.
Part II of this Comment will discuss the facts and procedural history of Evans. In Part III, we will take an in-depth look at the majority,
concurring, and dissenting opinions in Evans, as they are fairly emblematic of the various emerging theoretical approaches to sexual orientation discrimination under Title VII. Part IV will discuss the historical framework of sex discrimination under Title VII, particularly
the Supreme Court cases that have carved a path for recognizing sexual orientation discrimination as actionable under Title VII.
Finally, Part V will explain why it seems the dissent in Evans got
it right, or at the very least why the dissent’s point of view is gaining
momentum as other courts and the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) hold that sexual orientation discrimination is actionable under Title VII. Part VI will also briefly discuss how a Title
VII sexual orientation discrimination case might fare in the Supreme
Court.
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Facts
From August 1, 2012 to October 11, 2013, Jameka Evans worked
at Georgia Regional Hospital as a security officer.8 Evans is a lesbian
woman who “identifie[s] with the male gender.”9 During her tenure at
4. Samuel A. Marcosson, Harassment on the Basis of Sexual Orientation: A Claim of Sex
Discrimination Under Title VII, 81 GEO. L.J. 1, 3 (1992).
5. 850 F.3d 1248 (11th Cir. 2017).
6. Id.
7. Id. at 1261–73 (Rosenbaum, J., dissenting).
8. Id. at 1250–51 (majority opinion).
9. Id.
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the hospital, Evans claimed that as a result of her non-conformity to
her male boss’s gender stereotypes, namely her sexual orientation and
outwardly masculine appearance, “she was denied equal pay or work,
harassed, and physically assaulted or battered.”10
Evans alleged that her boss conspired to terminate her by “making
her employment unbearable,” insofar as he promoted a less qualified
individual to be her direct supervisor, and he repeatedly closed a door
on her “in a rude manner.”11 Additionally, she “experienced scheduling issues and a shift change” as well as harassment from her new
supervisor and tampering with her equipment.12 Finally, Evans claims
that when she lodged a complaint against her employers to Human
Resources, the Human Resources Manager asked her about her sexuality—indicating to Evans that her sexuality may have been the basis
of the discriminatory treatment she received.13
B. Procedural History
Evans, as a pro se litigant, brought suit against her employer for
the alleged discrimination based on her status as a lesbian woman and
gender non-conformity, as well as a claim for retaliation in violation
of Title VII.14 With respect to Evans’s claims of discrimination based
on her sexual orientation and gender non-conformity—the claims at
the focus of this Comment—a magistrate judge found: Title VII “was
not intended to cover discrimination against homosexuals.”15 With regard to Evans’s claim of discrimination based on gender non-conformity, the magistrate judge concluded that it was “just another way to
claim discrimination based on sexual orientation,” no matter how it
was otherwise characterized.16
The magistrate judge recommended dismissing all of Evans’s
claims with prejudice.17 Evans timely objected to the magistrate
judge’s report and recommendation, with the support of an amicus curiae brief filed by the Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc.

10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1248.
Id. at 1252.
Id.
Id.
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(“Lambda”).18 The District Court for the Southern District of Georgia
adopted the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation without
further comment, and appointed counsel from Lambda to represent
Evans on appeal.19
The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit vacated the dismissal of Evans’s gender non-conformity claim and remanded “with instructions to grant Evans leave to amend such claim.”20 The court affirmed, however, that sexual orientation discrimination is not
actionable under Title VII, and consequently affirmed the dismissal of
Evans’s claim of discrimination due to her status as a lesbian woman.21
Circuit Judge William Pryor concurred with the majority, while Circuit Judge Rosenbaum dissented.22 Furthermore, Evans filed a petition
for writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court, which was denied.23
III. REASONING OF THE COURT
A. Majority Opinion
The majority first addressed whether alleged discrimination
based on gender non-conformity is actionable under Title VII, or “just
another way to claim discrimination based on sexual orientation.”24 It
held that it is in fact actionable, pointing to the Eleventh Circuit’s holding in Glenn v. Brumby.25 The court in Glenn, relying on Price Waterhouse, held that discrimination against a transgender individual on the
basis of that individual’s failure to conform to a gender stereotype is
sex-based discrimination actionable under Title VII.26
The court found that Evans “did not provide enough factual matter to plausibly suggest that her decision to present herself in a masculine manner led to the alleged adverse employment actions.”27 However, because pro se litigants should generally be allowed to amend
18. Id.; see also Proposed Amicus Curiae Brief of Lambda Legal Defense & Education Fund,
Inc. in Support of Plaintiff’s Objections to Magistrate’s Report and Recommendation, Evans v. Ga.
Reg’l Hosp., 850 F.3d 1248 (11th Cir. 2017) (No. CV415-103).
19. Evans, 850 F.3d at 1253.
20. Id. at 1255.
21. Id. at 1257.
22. Id. at 1258 (Pryor, J., concurring), 1261 (Rosenbaum, J., dissenting).
23. Evans v. Ga. Reg’l Hosp., 850 F.3d 1248 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, Evans v. Ga. Reg’l
Hosp., 138 S. Ct. 557 (2017) (mem.).
24. Evans, 850 F.3d at 1254.
25. Id. at 1254–55 (citing Glenn v. Brumby, 663 F.3d 1312, 1316 (11th Cir. 2011)).
26. Glenn, 663 F.3d at 1316.
27. Evans, 850 F.3d at 1254.
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complaints, and an attempt to do so by Evans could not be deemed
futile, the court remanded Evans’s gender non-conformity claim, with
instructions to allow her to amend her complaint.28
The court then addressed whether a plaintiff may sustain a claim
of discrimination based on sexual orientation under Title VII.29 The
court relied on Blum v. Gulf Oil Corp.,30 which held that “[d]ischarge
for homosexuality is not prohibited by Title VII.”31 The court disagreed that the Supreme Court decisions in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins and Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc.32 support claims
for sexual orientation discrimination under Title VII.33 The court reasoned that neither case’s holding “squarely address[ed] whether sexual orientation discrimination is prohibited by Title VII.”34
Finally, the court bolstered its holding by citing cases from nearly
all other circuits supporting the proposition that sexual orientation discrimination is not actionable under Title VII.35 Not a single supporting
case cited, however, was decided after 2006.36 Furthermore, the court
refused to address whether the decisions it cited from other circuits
were inconsistent with Price Waterhouse or Oncale as Evans and the
EEOC as amicus curiae argued. It instead maintained that Blum controlled its decision, and as such, it was bound to affirm the district
court’s dismissal of Evans’s sexual orientation claim.37
B. Judge Pryor’s Concurrence
The concurrence basically sets forth two main arguments. The
first is that sexual orientation discrimination and discrimination based
on gender nonconformity are “legally distinct” concepts, and as such,

28. Id. at 1254–55.
29. Id. at 1255.
30. 597 F.2d 936 (5th Cir. 1979).
31. Evans, 850 F.3d at 1255 (quoting Blum, 597 F.2d at 938); see also Bonner v. City of
Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (“[W]e choose the decisions of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, as that court existed on September 30, 1981, handed down
by that court prior to the close of business on that date,” as binding precedent in the Eleventh Circuit.).
32. 523 U.S. 75, 82 (1998) (holding that sex discrimination consisting of same-sex sexual
harassment is actionable under Title VII).
33. Evans, 850 F.3d at 1256.
34. Id.
35. See id.
36. See id.
37. Id. at 1257.
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the former does not necessarily constitute the latter.38 The second sets
forth general disdain for the dissent’s arguments and asserts that if
sexual orientation discrimination ought to be covered by Title VII, it
is up to the legislature to explicitly make it so.39
1. Sexual Orientation Discrimination and Discrimination Based on
Gender Nonconformity Are Legally Distinct
The concurrence asserts that although sexual orientation discrimination and discrimination based on gender nonconformity may overlap considerably, any notion that the former always constitutes the latter “relies on false stereotypes of gay individuals.”40 Judge Pryor
disputes the idea that “all gay individuals necessarily engage in the
same behavior.”41 In apparent defense of gay individuals, Judge Pryor
dives into a discussion of the spectrum of sexual identities which gay
individuals “adopt,” and accuses the dissent and the EEOC of “stereotyp[ing] all gay individuals in the same way that the Commission and
dissent allege that the Hospital stereotyped Evans.”42
Ultimately, however, his argument amounts to a distinction between status and behavior. Judge Pryor asserts that an employee who
has experienced discrimination based on sexual orientation can have a
legally cognizable gender-nonconformity claim only if he or she can
prove the discriminatory action was taken because of the employee’s
nonconforming behavior, and not solely because of his or her nonconforming status as a gay individual.43 Judge Pryor maintains that the
latter is merely an “invention” by the dissent without precedential support.44
2. Even if the Dissent Were Right, It Is Up to the Legislature to Give
Legal Effect to the Dissent’s Arguments.
Judge Pryor further inflates this distinction between status and
behavior by arguing that “a status-based [inquiry] does more than misread precedent; it also does violence to the relationship between the

38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Id. at 1258 (Pryor, J., concurring).
Id. at 1260–61.
Id. at 1258.
Id.
Id. at 1259.
Id.
Id.
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doctrine [of gender nonconformity] and the enumerated classes of Title VII.”45 He explains, “The doctrine of gender nonconformity is not
an independent vehicle for relief; it is instead a proxy a plaintiff uses
to help support [the] argument that an employer discriminated on the
basis of the enumerated sex category . . . .”46
He reiterates that the gender nonconformity doctrine is behaviorbased, and as such, “[s]tatus-based protections must stem from a separate doctrine or directly from the text of Title VII.”47 Judge Pryor
concludes with a reminder for the dissent that the job of the court is to
declare what the law is, not what it should be.48 Therefore, Judge Pryor
asserts, the dissent’s arguments are best raised “before Congress, not
this Court.”49
C. Judge Rosenbaum’s Dissent
Judge Rosenbaum’s dissent begins with a reiteration of the holding in Price Waterhouse: “Title VII precludes discrimination on the
basis of every stereotype of what a woman supposedly should
be . . . .”50 He explains that Price Waterhouse “necessarily abrogated”
the holding in Blum on which the majority relied.51 He asserts that “it
is utter fiction” to find a woman discriminated against because she is
lesbian “was not discriminated against for failing to comport with her
employer’s stereotyped view of women.”52 Because such discrimination is explicitly proscribed by Price Waterhouse, Judge Rosenbaum
would find sexual orientation discrimination actionable under Title
VII.53
Judge Rosenbaum continues to discuss the impact of Price Waterhouse on Title VII sex discrimination jurisprudence. He notes the
Eleventh Circuit’s subsequent decision in Glenn in which the Court
relied on Price Waterhouse to apply the “prescriptive-stereotyping
theory to hold that discrimination against a transgender employee
merely because the employee fails to conform to the employer’s view

45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

Id. at 1260.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1261.
Id.
Id. (Rosenbaum, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id.
Id.
Id.
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of what a member of the employee’s birth-assigned sex should be violates Title VII.”54
The dissent criticizes the majority and concurrence for departing
from Glenn. He reasons,
By definition, a gay employee is sexually attracted to members of her own sex. So when an employer discriminates
against an employee solely because she is a lesbian, the employer acts against the employee only because she is sexually
attracted to women, instead of being attracted to only men,
like the employer prescriptively believes women should be.55
Judge Rosenbaum laments the concurrence’s and the majority’s
re-characterization of sexual orientation in contradiction of their own
reasoning in Glenn. He refers to the concurrence’s behavior-status distinction as “artificial” and “arbitrary.”56 Judge Rosenbaum remarks,
“In the concurrence’s world, only the person who acts on her feelings
enjoys the protection of Title VII. This makes no sense from a practical, textual, or doctrinal point of view.”57 He continues, “It cannot possibly be the case that a lesbian who is private about her sexuality . . .
can be discriminated against by the employer because she does not
comport with the employer’s view of what a woman should be, while
the outwardly lesbian plaintiff enjoys Title VII protection.”58
Judge Rosenbaum also disagrees with the notion that the Supreme
Court has found a distinction between behavior and status in applying
Title VII to proscriptive stereotyping sex discrimination. He reiterates,
“The concurrence’s distinction between ‘behavior’ and ‘being’ is a
construct that is both illusory in its defiance of logic and artificial in
its lack of a legal basis.”59
Judge Rosenbaum next addresses the concurrence’s seemingly
defensive discussion of the various lifestyles gay individuals may
choose. Yet, he explains, “The concurrence’s argument seems to fundamentally misunderstand what it means to be a lesbian. Lesbians are
women who are sexually attracted to women. That’s not a stereotype;
it’s a definition.”60
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

Id. at 1264.
Id. (citation omitted).
Id. at 1266.
Id. at 1267.
Id.
Id. at 1268.
Id. at 1269.
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Judge Rosenbaum likewise disposes with the majority’s Blumbased reasoning because he believes it “directly conflict[s] with Price
Waterhouse[].”61 He also criticizes the majority’s reliance on other
circuits’ rulings—“the mere fact that our friends may jump off a bridge
does not, in and of itself, make it a good idea for us to do so.”62
Finally, Judge Rosenbaum cites several district court decisions
that have reached the conclusion that sexual orientation discrimination
is actionable under Title VII cases which the concurrence and majority
failed to acknowledge.63
IV. HISTORICAL FRAMEWORK
A. Sexual Orientation Discrimination Under Title VII
It is well established that Title VII prohibits an employer from
discriminating against an employee because of his or her sex.64 However, sex was actually added to Title VII at the “last minute” and,
“[a]ccordingly, the legislative history contains little discussion about
what constitutes sex discrimination, leaving the definition open to judicial interpretation.”65
For years, district and appellate courts have dealt with sexual orientation claims under Title VII by frankly not dealing with them—that
is, dismissing claims of sexual orientation as not actionable under Title
VII.66 As a result of this long-standing unanimity, the Supreme Court
has never explicitly addressed the question. However, the Supreme
Court has issued a few opinions broadening the scope of protection
provided by Title VII’s “because of . . . sex” clause.67 Below is a discussion of the relevant Supreme Court cases as they carve a path for
recognizing sexual orientation discrimination as actionable under Title
VII.

61. Id. at 1270 (first alteration in original).
62. Id. at 1271.
63. Id. at 1272–73.
64. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1994).
65. Camille Patti, Hively v. Ivy Tech Community College: Losing the Battle but Winning the
War for Title VII Sexual Orientation Discrimination Protection, 26 TUL. J.L. & SEXUALITY 133,
135 (2017).
66. Simonton v. Runyon, 232 F.3d 33, 35 (2d Cir. 2000) (“The law is well-settled in this circuit
and in all others to have reached the question that Simonton has no cause of action under Title VII
because Title VII does not prohibit harassment or discrimination because of sexual orientation.”).
67. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1994).
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B. Supreme Court Decisions
In 1978, the Supreme Court held in City of Los Angeles Department of Water & Power v. Manhart68 that generalizations about a class
of individuals, even when true, do not justify discrimination against
an individual to whom the generalization does not apply.69 In other
words, “[i]f height is required for a job, a tall woman may not be refused employment merely because, on the average, women are too
short.”70 This holding recognized what the dissent in Evans called “ascriptive stereotyping” as an avenue for setting forth a legally cognizable claim of sex discrimination in violation of Title VII.71
Just over ten years later in Price Waterhouse, the Supreme Court
held that Title VII precluded not only sex discrimination based on an
assumed gender stereotype regardless of whether the employee met
the stereotype, but also discrimination based on failure to conform to
a gender stereotype.72 The dissent in Evans referred to this form of
stereotyping as “prescriptive.”73 The Court in Price Waterhouse maintained that “[i]n forbidding employers to discriminate against individuals because of their sex, Congress intended to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women resulting from sex
stereotypes.”74
Additionally, in 1998, the Supreme Court held in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc. that same-sex sexual harassment
(when the alleged harasser and employee are of the same sex) is cognizable as sex discrimination under Title VII.75 The dissent in Evans
would have held that these rulings abrogated the Eleventh Circuit
precedent relied on by the majority and concurrence. Regardless of
whether or not the Supreme Court intended to lay the groundwork for
recognizing sexual orientation discrimination claims under Title VII,
courts have increasingly been using these cases to reach that exact
conclusion.

68. 435 U.S. 702 (1978).
69. Id. at 708.
70. Id.
71. Id.; Evans v. Ga. Reg’l Hosp., 850 F.3d 1248, 1263 (11th Cir. 2017) (Rosenbaum, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
72. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989).
73. Evans, 850 F.3d at 1262 (Rosenbaum, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
74. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 251 (alteration in original) (quoting Manhart, 435 U.S. at
707 n.13).
75. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 82 (1998).
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V. ANALYSIS
A. Evans is Moving in the Wrong Direction
Judge Rosenbaum’s in-depth explanation of the legal significance
of the Supreme Court’s holding in Price Waterhouse is illuminating.
Most informative of the scope of the Price Waterhouse holding is the
Supreme Court’s finding that “[i]n forbidding employers to discriminate against individuals because of their sex, Congress intended to
strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women
resulting from sex stereotypes.”76
The dissent’s point of view in Evans is agreeable insofar as it
seems to breathe life into the “entire spectrum” language in Price Waterhouse.77 The Merriam-Webster Learner’s Dictionary defines “stereotype” as “an often unfair and untrue belief that many people have
about all people or things with a particular characteristic.”78 The
“characteristic” at issue here is gender; and indeed, stereotypes linked
to gender run deeper than “all women like shopping” and “all men like
football.” Societal notions of gender and sexual orientation are inextricably linked.
The crux of Judge Rosenbaum’s argument is this: many people
share the belief that all men and women are (or should be) attracted to
persons of the opposite sex; thus, when a person is attracted to another
of the same sex, they are non-conforming to their respective gender
stereotype of heterosexuality.79 Therefore, a person who discriminates
against a person because he or she is attracted to someone of the same
sex is necessarily discriminating against someone because he or she
has failed to conform to the discriminator’s notions of who he or she
should be attracted to based on his or her gender.
Whether or not this logic is completely sound, Judge Rosenbaum
is not alone in this thinking. In fact, this logic seems to be gaining
traction in the courts. On July 15, 2015, the EEOC issued an administrative decision holding that “sexual orientation is inherently a ‘sex-

76. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 251 (alteration in original) (quoting Manhart, 435 U.S. at
707 n.13).
77. Evans, 850 F.3d at 1263 (Rosenbaum, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
78. MERRIAM-WEBSTER LEARNER’S DICTIONARY, http://www.learnersdictionary.com/definition/stereotype (last visited March 18, 2018).
79. Evans, 850 F.3d at 1261 (Rosenbaum, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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based consideration,’ and an allegation of discrimination based on sexual orientation is necessarily an allegation of sex discrimination under
Title VII.”80
Taking this logic as persuasive authority, several district courts
and two appellate courts have followed suit, holding that sexual orientation discrimination is inherently sex-based discrimination and therefore legally cognizable under Title VII.81 Although the Supreme Court
denied certiorari in Evans,82 the EEOC decision in Baldwin and wave
of district court decisions to follow may eventually lead to a Supreme
Court case on point.83
B. Predicting a Future Supreme Court Ruling on the Issue
If the Supreme Court indeed grants certiorari in a Title VII case
involving sexual orientation discrimination in the future, one naturally
might wonder how such a case may fare. Indeed, if the current Supreme Court bench hears such a case, gay rights advocates may have
cause for hope.
The current makeup of the bench leaves Justice Kennedy as the
swing vote.84 With the addition of Justice Neil Gorsuch—who has
been recognized as ideologically similar to the late Justice Scalia—
Justice Kennedy once again finds himself the lone moderate on the
80. Baldwin v. Foxx, No. 0120133080, 2015 WL 4397641, at *6 (EEOC July 15, 2015).
81. Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 883 F.3d 100, 112 (2d Cir. 2018) (“[S]exual orientation
discrimination is motivated, at least in part, by sex and is thus a subset of sex discrimination under
Title VII.”); Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. of Ind., 853 F.3d 339, 341 (7th Cir. 2017) (“[D]iscrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is a form of sex discrimination.”); Philpott v. New York,
252 F. Supp. 3d 313, 317 (S.D.N.Y. 2017) (“Sexual orientation discrimination . . . is cognizable
under Title VII.”); U.S. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm. v. Scott Med. Health Ctr., P.C., 217 F.
Supp. 3d 834, 839 (W.D. Pa. 2016) (“Title VII’s ‘because of sex’ provision prohibits discrimination
on the basis of sexual orientation.”); Videckis v. Pepperdine Univ., 150 F. Supp. 3d 1151, 1151
(C.D. Cal. 2015) (“[C]laims of sexual orientation discrimination are gender stereotype or sex discrimination claims covered by Title VII . . . .”).
82. Evans v. Ga. Reg’l Hosp., 850 F.3d 1248 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, Evans v. Ga. Reg’l
Hosp., 138 S. Ct. 557 (2017) (mem.).
83. Patti, supra note 65, at 145 (“Given the changes in the social understanding of both sex
and sexuality that the justices recognized in Obergefell, the Supreme Court should take the opportunity created by Hively to formally hold that Title VII protects victims of sexual orientation discrimination.”); see generally Alex Swoyer, Supreme Court Declines to Settle Gay Rights Employment Discrimination, WASH. TIMES (Dec. 11, 2017),
https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2017/dec/11/supreme-court-declines-settle-gay-rightsemploymen/ (“[O]ther cases will eventually force the justices to confront the thorny issue.”).
84. Adam Liptak & Matt Flegenheimer, Neil Gorsuch Confirmed by Senate as Supreme Court
Justice, N.Y. TIMES (April 7, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/07/us/politics/neil-gorsuch-supreme-court.html (“Justice Kennedy . . . continues to hold the crucial vote in many closely
divided cases.”).
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bench.85 So, with a Title VII sexual orientation discrimination case
potentially on the horizon for the Supreme Court, and with Justice
Kennedy still sitting in the proverbial “hot seat,” could the stage be set
for another Romer v. Evans86 showdown?
In Romer, Justice Kennedy authored the majority opinion in
which the Court struck down an amendment to the Colorado Constitution—which “preclude[d] all legislative, executive, or judicial action at any level of state or local government designed to protect . . .
‘homosexual, lesbian or bisexual [persons] . . .’”—as violating the
equal protection clause.87 Despite sexual orientation being a non-suspect classification subject to rational basis review, Justice Kennedy
rejected the proffered purpose for the law as protecting landlords’ and
employers’ religious objections to homosexuality.88 Instead, Justice
Kennedy wrote, “We must conclude that Amendment 2 classifies homosexuals not to further a proper legislative end but to make them
unequal to everyone else. This Colorado cannot do. A State cannot so
deem a class of persons a stranger to its laws.”89
Justice Scalia, in an unsurprisingly pithy dissent, made his point
clear: “This Court has no business imposing upon all Americans the
resolution favored by the elite class from which the Members of this
institution are selected, pronouncing that ‘animosity’ toward homosexuality is evil.”90
Could this “landmark decision on the gay rights front”91 be an
indication of how a Title VII sexual orientation discrimination case
might play out? One can imagine Justice Gorsuch taking a position
similar to Justice Scalia’s, given his Scalia-esque commitment “to following the original understanding of those who drafted and ratified the
Constitution.”92 But the more difficult prediction comes in discerning
whether Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion can really be taken as an
indication of an ideological preference for broadening the scope of
85. Benjamin Bell, How Neil Gorsuch Could Affect the Supreme Court, ABC NEWS
(April 10, 2017, 4:18 AM), http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/neil-gorsuch-affect-supremecourt/story?id=46691852.
86. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
87. Id. at 620.
88. Id. at 635.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 636 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
91. Tobin A. Sparling, The Odd Couple: How Justices Kennedy and Scalia, Together, Advanced Gay Rights in Romer v. Evans, 67 MERCER L. REV. 305, 307 (2016).
92. Liptak & Flegenheimer, supra note 84.
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federal protection against discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.
Although Justice Kennedy never explicitly framed his opinion as
furthering a gay rights agenda,93 his willingness to strike down the
amendment to the Colorado statute despite the Court’s previous ruling
in Bowers v. Hardwick94 and in the face of highly deferential rational
basis review indicates otherwise. Ultimately, however, there is no way
to guarantee Romer déjà vu, especially since a Supreme Court decision
on the Title VII issue may hang on the minutiae of the substantive Title
VII jurisprudence discussed above as opposed to the policy-based
equal protection analysis employed in Romer.
VI. CONCLUSION
The majority and concurrence in Evans represent where courts
have historically landed on the question of whether discrimination
based on sexual orientation is actionable under Title VII. On the other
hand, the dissent represents where courts seem to be headed on the
same issue. With an emerging circuit split, the stage is set for the Supreme Court to end the debate. Although it is difficult to predict how
such a case might turn out, it will no doubt be significant to both legal
scholars and gay rights advocates alike.

93. Sparling, supra note 91, at 306–07.
94. 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (holding that a Georgia sodomy statute did not violate the fundamental rights of homosexuals).

